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Humbug: Toward a Legal History 
SUSANNA BLUMENTHAL† 
INTRODUCTION 
“Fraud is infinite.”1 So wrote Lord Hardwicke to Lord 
Kames in a 1759 letter, opining that courts of equity could 
not “lay down rules, how far they would go, and no farther” 
without finding their jurisdiction “cramped, and perpetually 
eluded by new schemes, which the fertility of man’s 
invention would contrive.”2 The words of this jurist acquired 
increasing currency in an era of dizzying commercial 
development, finding their way into nineteenth-century 
American as well as English legal discourse. They passed 
from Joseph Story’s Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 
into the decisional law of several states,3 which was 
recapitulated in treatises such as Melville Bigelow’s The 
Law of Fraud, perpetuating the notion that the law had to 
remain open-ended if fraudsters were to be brought to 
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 1. JOSEPH PARKES, Correspondence of Lord Hardwicke and Lord Kames on 
the Principles of Equity, in A HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY; WITH 
PRACTICAL REMARKS 501, 508 (1828). 
 2. Id. 
 3. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS 
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1836). 
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justice.4 “Fraud is kaleidoscopic, infinite,” a Missouri judge 
confirmed in a 1913 opinion, embellishing only slightly as 
he reiterated the conventional judicial wisdom that “a hard 
and fast definition” was neither possible nor desirable as a 
matter of law.5 Without relieving the buyer of the 
requirement to beware, he maintained that “there is a 
boundary that may not be crossed” by sellers, though he 
deliberately declined to say where it was: “[F]raud-feasors[ ] 
would like nothing half so well as for courts to say they 
would go thus far, and no further in its pursuit.”6  
P. T. Barnum inadvertently illustrated this point in The 
Humbugs of the World, his sprawling treatise/exposé of “the 
tricks of the trade” comprising this “universal science.”7 
Mimicking (if not mocking) the learned professors of his 
day, he began with a disquisition on definitions, one that 
made no mention of Hardwicke or any other legal authority, 
but instead consulted the dictionary of “Doctor Webster.”8 
There Barnum found humbug defined as “imposition under 
fair pretences” when used as a noun, and as “to deceive; to 
impose upon” when deployed as a verb. “With all due 
deference,” he took exception to this entry because it might 
be read to comprehend unlawful as well as lawful forms of 
misrepresentation.9 Transparently seeking to clear humbug 
of any implication of wrongdoing (not least because his 
name had become synonymous with it),10 Barnum suggested 
the term was most commonly understood to exclude “crimes 
and arrant swindles.”11 He observed that a respectable-
looking man who gained the confidence of another in order 
  
 4. MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF FRAUD AND THE PROCEDURE 
PERTAINING TO THE REDRESS THEREOF (1877). 
 5. Stonemets v. Head, 154 S.W. 108, 114 (Mo. 1913). 
 6. Id. at 113-14. 
 7. P.T. BARNUM, The HUMBUGS OF THE WORLD, at vii (1866).  
 8. Id. at 7. 
 9. Id. 
 10. BLUFORD ADAMS, E. PLURIBUS BARNUM: THE GREAT SHOWMAN AND THE 
MAKING OF U.S. POPULAR CULTURE (1997); BARNUM, supra note 7, at 7; JAMES W. 
COOK, THE ARTS OF DECEPTION: PLAYING WITH FRAUD IN THE AGE OF BARNUM 
(2001); NEIL HARRIS, HUMBUG: THE ART OF P.T. BARNUM (1973). 
 11. BARNUM, supra note 7, at 1. 
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to pass a spurious draft or bank note was “justly called a 
‘forger,’ or a ‘counterfeiter;’ and if arrested, he is punished 
as such; but nobody thinks of calling him a ‘humbug.’”12 A 
humbug did not impose with the intent to injure and he 
might well be “an honest, upright man”13—a philanthropist, 
even, if he shared the showman’s benevolent aim of 
improving the minds and morals of his audience under the 
cover of entertainment.14 
Despite, or perhaps because of, these professions of good 
faith, Barnum is often associated with the ethos of caveat 
emptor. In biographies and broader cultural studies, he is 
often taken to exemplify the creative deceptions enabled 
and validated by the era’s “increasingly market-friendly 
law.”15 A number of the new histories of capitalism, most 
notably Jane Kamensky’s The Exchange Artist and Stephen 
Mihm’s A Nation of Counterfeiters, have reinforced this 
rendering of the legal landscape, leaving the impression 
that police and prosecutors were overmatched by a wily 
class of money-makers, who took full advantage of the 
ambiguous borderlands “between capitalist enterprise and 
criminal mischief.” The law and its enforcers most often 
figure as flouted authorities in these accounts, 
uncoordinated and ill-equipped to meet the challenges posed 
by the confidence man in his various guises.16 Although 
there is surely some truth to these characterizations, they 
are too often uncritically based upon popular literature 
ambivalently chronicling “the rogues and their rogueries” 
and the published confessions/boasts of the swindlers 
themselves. Put differently, the appearances of legal laxity 
drawn from these sources are deceiving. Casting the 
evidentiary net to encompass trial records, statute books, 
treatises, appellate opinions and trial records as well as 
  
 12. Id. at 7. 
 13. Id. at 10. 
 14. See COOK, supra note 10, at 22-23; HARRIS, supra note 10, at 214-31. 
 15. COOK, supra note 10, at 114. 
 16. JANE KAMENSKY, THE EXCHANGE ARTIST: A TALE OF HIGH-FLYING 
SPECULATION AND AMERICA’S FIRST BANKING COLLAPSE (2008); STEPHEN MIHM, A 
NATION OF COUNTERFEITERS: CAPITALISTS, CON MEN, AND THE MAKING OF THE 
UNITED STATES 106 (2007). 
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trade journals, newspapers, novels, and other cultural 
forms, this Paper is part of a broader investigation into the 
modes of regulation—public and private, formal and 
informal, federal, state, and local—that Americans deployed 
as they reckoned with the problem of deceit over the course 
of the long nineteenth century. Rightly apprehended, 
Barnum was an integral part of this endeavor. In 
attempting to write humbug out of the law of fraud, the 
showman was certainly playing with its indeterminacy. But 
he was also invested in establishing himself as a legitimate 
sort of imposter, the purveyor of a valuable and edifying 
form of amusement.17 The Humbugs of the World was, in a 
sense, the homage he paid to The Law of Fraud. Upon closer 
inspection, it becomes clear that the play in the law was 
often a source of its strength because it enabled public and 
private prosecutors to keep pace with and sometimes make 
like the malefactors they endeavored to bring to justice. 
Although there is no gainsaying the institutional limitations 
that hampered such enforcement efforts, which were surely 
rendered peculiarly challenging in a culture that valorized 
entrepreneurial ingenuity and preached the virtue of 
looking sharp, the evidence on this score hardly warrants 
the conclusion that the enterprises of capitalists and 
criminals were practically indistinguishable in this 
burgeoning market society. Operating in the shadow of a 
legal system that distributed regulatory powers to a 
widening network of municipal, state, and federal officials; 
relying all the while upon the vigilance of private citizens 
and the popular press as well as the self-policing of a host of 
trade associations; Americans tested the meaning of the law 
of fraud daily, whether they knew it or not.18 
  
 17. See COOK, supra note 10, at 260-62; HARRIS, supra note 10, at 215-31. 
 18. On the obsessive concern about fraud and imposture within the middle-
class culture of the nineteenth century, see, for example, ELAINE S. ABELSON, 
WHEN LADIES GO A-THIEVING: MIDDLE-CLASS SHOPLIFTERS IN THE VICTORIAN 
DEPARTMENT STORE (1989); COOK, supra note 10; KATHLEEN DE GRAVE, 
SWINDLER, SPY, REBEL: THE CONFIDENCE WOMAN IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA (1995); ANN FABIAN, CARD SHARPS, DREAM BOOKS, & BUCKET SHOPS: 
GAMBLING IN 19TH-CENTURY AMERICA (1990); KAREN HALTTUNEN, CONFIDENCE 
MEN AND PAINTED LADIES: A STUDY OF MIDDLE-CLASS CULTURE IN AMERICA, 
1830–1870 (1982); JOHN KASSON, RUDENESS AND CIVILITY: MANNERS IN 
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The contours of this normative universe can be 
reconstructed most readily and effectively by retracing the 
steps of the shifty characters who did not get away, but who 
were placed on trial along with their impostures in 
courtrooms and the popular press that represented these 
events to an ever more expansive, transatlantic audience. In 
what follows, I focus on a single criminal case: the 
sensational forgery trial of Charles B. Huntington, a Wall 
Street broker who was tried and convicted of this offense in 
1856, illustrating how and why it ought to be taken as a 
critical juncture in fraud’s intellectual history as David 
Hollinger has defined the focal point of the field: the 
historical acts “of people who ‘made history’ by arguing.”19 
The judge, lawyers, witnesses, and newsmen who 
participated in this legal spectacle may be taken to fit this 
description and they have left behind a rich documentary 
basis for reflecting more generally upon the problematics of 
writing a legal history of humbug, ultimately going to show 
that capturing fraud was a funny business in Barnum’s 
America.20 
  
NINETEENTH-CENTURY URBAN AMERICA (1990); JACKSON LEARS, FABLES OF 
ABUNDANCE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF ADVERTISING IN AMERICA (1994); R. 
LAURENCE MOORE, IN SEARCH OF WHITE CROWS: SPIRITUALISM, PARAPSYCHOLOGY, 
AND AMERICAN CULTURE (1977). Although some attention has been drawn to the 
regulation of fraud, see MICHAEL PETTIT, THE SCIENCE OF DECEPTION: 
PSYCHOLOGY AND COMMERCE IN AMERICA (2013); RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED: 
THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2011). Only 
recently has law been made a central focus. See Edward J. Balleisen, Private 
Cops on the Fraud Beat: The Limits of Self-Regulation, 1895-1932, 83 BUS. HIST. 
REV. 113, 128-32, 144-48 (2009); Robert E. Mensel, “A Diddle at Brobdingnag”: 
Confidence and Caveat Emptor During the Market Revolution, 38 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 97, 117-27 (2007). For valuable doctrinal studies, see KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, 
LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW (1982); Paula 
Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790-1860: Continuity Amidst Change, 39 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 405 (1995). 
 19. David A. Hollinger, “What is Our ‘Canon’? How American Intellectual 
Historians Debate the Core of their Field, 9 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 185, 187 (2012). 
 20. See, e.g., id. Law remains a relatively understudied aspect of studies of 
the intellectual life of the United States and the same may be said of the newest 
histories of capitalism; while scholars writing in this vein insist that capitalism 
be understood as a “knowledge economy” as well as a mode of production, they 
have yet to accord systematic attention to the role of legal institutions, 
practices, and professionals in the capitalist transformation of the nineteenth 
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I. THE CRIME OF FORGERY 
The arrest of Charles B. Huntington on the charge of 
forgery in early October 1856 quickly became the talk of the 
town. It was said to be “the chief theme of conversation, not 
only in Wall street, among the bulls and bears, but among 
all classes of the community,” both within and far beyond 
the city, owing in no small part to an entrepreneurial press. 
Indeed, his arrest touched off something of a media circus, 
as reporters rivaled each other in their daily disclosures 
about “The Great Wall Street Forgery Case.” Although the 
initial charge against this Wall Street broker was based 
upon a single note for $6500, readers were assured this was 
but a small specimen of the hundreds of thousands of 
dollars of “spurious paper” he had put into circulation. 
Presuming the guilt of “HUNTINGTON THE 
FORGER,” newspapers reconstructed this criminal’s 
biography, painting a portrait of creative self-destruction, of 
a villain as hapless as he was audacious, his capacity for 
self-delusion proving infectious, as it seemed to inspire 
others to confide in him. Although the accused was an 
unknown quantity when he set up shop in a basement Wall 
Street office in 1847, possessing neither friends nor capital, 
he nonetheless managed to obtain sizable loans rather 
readily from the most “responsible” and “respectable” of 
firms. Offering a combination of forged and genuine notes as 
collateral, he endeavored to redeem them before their 
maturity so as to “conceal the fraudulent modus operandi by 
which he effected his designs.” Huntington’s success was not 
easily attributed to his skill and circumspection. Many of 
the forged notes Huntington passed contained signatures 
that “did not even pretend to be imitations” and he spent 
the money he had made by living extravagantly in plain 
sight. Indeed, Huntington was the most conspicuous of 
consumers, famously addicted to the finest cigars, fastest 
horses, and prettiest women that money could buy; he was 
also well-known for hosting ostentatious parties at one of 
  
century. See generally CAPITALISM TAKES COMMAND: THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (Michael Zakim & Gary J. 
Kornblith eds., 2012). 
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two ridiculously over-furnished houses he leased in lower 
Manhattan to provide separate living spaces for his family 
and a lady friend who was not his wife. Therein lay the 
puzzle for many a newsman and presumably his readers as 
well: why did it take so long for this unabashed double-
dealer to be apprehended as such?21 
The perplexity only deepened as the case was set for 
trial. Huntington retained the services of the veteran trial 
attorney James Brady, and maintained an air of 
nonchalance in the meantime, enjoying the “sumptuous 
fare” his fashionable wife dutifully brought every evening to 
his well-appointed cell at the Tombs. Huntington’s reticence 
on the advice of counsel excited debate about whether a 
financier (or, for that matter, a lawyer) could be 
distinguished from a fraudster. The editor of the New York 
Daily News strenuously argued against any sweeping 
generalizations and insisted that “the exposure of such 
reckless rogues” as Huntington “need excite no alarm of 
uneasiness as to the rectitude of the commercial 
community” because he was “a mere vulgar forger” whose 
“operations were confined solely to his own use.” Truly great 
swindlers were said to be few and far between, constituting 
“mere specks upon the sun” who “ought to be looked upon 
with surprise on account of their rarity” and taken as 
negative examples, for they were sure to be “regarded as 
poor sneaks when detected, and very soon forgotten when 
they received the sentence which is sure, sooner or later, to 
be pronounced upon them.”22 
This complacency was echoed in the financial press but 
it was far from dominant in the public sphere. The daily 
dispatches of the New York Herald were more 
representative of the pretrial publicity in treating 
Huntington’s “unbounded extravagance” as a distressing 
sign of the times. His “career” was likened in these pages to 
“a display of fireworks—brilliant, but evanescent,” 
effectively “throwing a great deal of light on the operations 
  
 21. See The Great Wall Street Forgery Case, FARMER’S CABINET, Oct. 30, 1856, 
at 3; The New York Forgeries, AUGUSTA CHRON., Oct. 17, 1856, at 2. 
 22. Splendid Roguery, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1856 at 4; cf. The Recent Frauds 
in Wall Street, J. COMMERCE, reprinted in CHARLESTON MERCURY, Oct. 15, 1856. 
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of men of money in Wall Street and the neighborhood” and 
portending the moral and financial downfall of the nation as 
a whole. “In this age of fast living,” went the repeated 
refrain, “there is no time to regard social morality or look 
beneath the surface to find out whether our reputed 
millionaires and famous financiers have any solid 
foundation for their pretensions.” This willful blindness 
enabled a man like Huntington to set up “his shingle anew” 
in New York City even after he was captured and indicted 
on a forgery charge in Washington D.C. “with all due 
publicity.” If anything, Huntington’s brush with the law 
seemed to enhance his credit-worthiness within the 
financial world, winning him the “unlimited confidence of 
his brother sharpers.” It was lamentably the norm among 
members of this “codfish aristocracy” to discount bills 
suspected to be forgeries at usurious rates, thus implicating 
them “morally, if not legally” in Huntington’s crime. “This, 
perhaps, is the cause which deters some of the negotiators 
from stepping forward as prosecutors,” conjectured one 
reporter, “although there are others doubtless who object 
simply to appear in the character of dupes.” Those who had 
accepted Huntington’s bogus notes as security were 
regrettably but predictably more concerned with avoiding 
guilt or embarrassment by association than bringing this 
“vulgar” forger to justice.23 
Hours before Huntington was to be tried in a 
Manhattan courtroom on the first of twenty-seven 
indictments in mid-December, “the swarm of curiosity 
seekers had overflowed into the corridor, and dripping down 
the stairs, had formed a large human note of interrogation.” 
This attested to the trial’s status as “a case of public 
interest,” observed District Attorney A. Oakey Hall in his 
opening argument, which he began by simply reading the 
indictment and offering some etymological musings about 
another crime, one that had taken place in the realm of 
ideas: 
  
 23. See The Cause of Financial Revolutions, N.Y. HERALD, Oct. 18, 1856, at 4; 
The Huntington Forgeries, N.Y. HERALD, Oct. 25, 1856, at 4; see also Forgeries, 
FARMER’S CABINET, Nov. 11, 1856, at 2 (reprinting excerpts from a New York 
Herald article). 
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Now it is very singular, and something which eminently 
challenges the attention of the legal scholar, to know when and 
how and why the encyclopedia of criminal law robbed the 
dictionary of honest labor of the word FORGERY. You will not be 
able to find why and wherefore that the spendthrift sitting at his 
desk in secret—in self-imposed exile from the social community—
alone with his crimes and his vices, should do that according to 
the nomenclature of the law, which the arm of honest labor does 
as it strikes upon the anvil—forge—forgery! And yet through 
many years it has come down to us to mean that worst, that 
meanest, that most despicable of all commercial lies which a man 
can tell, or which a man can make,—a black lie and a white lie at 
the same time.24 
This was an ingenious rhetorical move, shoring up a 
producerism ethos that likely resonated with the twelve 
men empanelled to hear the case, drawn as they were from 
the middling classes of the burgeoning market society.25 It 
was also a point well taken from an etymological 
standpoint: forgery does indeed have a long and tangled 
linguistic association with fraud and its ilk. Historians of 
Anglo-American law who have had recourse to 
encyclopedias and dictionaries as well as other forms of 
evidence have since traced out these linguistic connections, 
identifying the Renaissance as the era in which the concept 
of forgery was first “abstracted from the concrete world” of 
iron forgers and “appl[ied] to the mind’s creative faculties.”26 
  
 24. JAMES A. BRADY & JOHN A. BRYAN, TRIAL OF CHARLES B. HUNTINGTON FOR 
FORGERY: PRINCIPAL DEFENCE: INSANITY 24 (1857). American law writers 
commonly drew this connection, many quoting Coke: “‘To forge . . . is 
metaphorically taken from the smith, who beateth upon his anvil, and forgeth 
what fashion or shape he will. The offence is called crimen falsi, and the 
offender falsarius; and the Latin word to forge is falsare or fabricare. And this is 
properly taken when the act is done in the name of another person.” James 
Wilson, Lectures on Law, reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES 
WILSON, L.L.D. 52 (Lorenzo Press 1804). 
 25. The published trial record includes a transcript of the empaneling of the 
jury and a list of the names, occupations, and addresses of those selected; the 
foreman was identified as an umbrella and parasol manufacturer, two others as 
dry goods merchants, and the remaining men as follows: commission merchant, 
soap maker, boot and shoe maker, umbrella manufacturer, wig-maker, liquor 
store merchant, music teacher, broker, and sash and blind maker. BRADY & 
BRYAN, supra note 24, at 20. 
 26. IAN HAYWOOD, THE ART AND POLITICS OF FORGERY 6 (1987). 
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Used in this sense, the word connoted a fabrication that was 
at once “imitative and original” and yet not necessarily 
fraudulent or designed to deceive. Though often carrying 
with it the dual signification of licit and illicit production, it 
could also refer to the work of God, He being the “forgere of 
alle thingus.”27 The early modern period witnessed a 
“hardening of the metaphor,” however, as the figure of the 
forger increasingly came to be identified with a “producer of 
false documents,” a development reflected and reinforced by 
statutory enactments periodically expanding the range of 
private as well as public instruments and records subject to 
legal regulation and ratcheting up the criminal penalties 
attaching to the forgery of them.28 
At common law, the crime of forgery was defined as “the 
fraudulent making or altering of a writing to the prejudice 
of another man’s right” and the severity of punishment 
turned upon the nature of the document that had been 
falsified.29 Whereas the making of a false royal charter and 
the counterfeiting of the king’s money or seal were both 
considered capital offenses, the forgery of deeds, wills, and 
other private documents was punishable by lesser penalties, 
ranging from fines and the pillory to mutilation, outlawry, 
and imprisonment. This hierarchy of wrongdoing was 
likewise observed in statutory provisions enacted in the 
later medieval and early modern period. The more 
important written documents came to be in the world of 
commerce, the more members of Parliament felt moved to 
strengthen the legal deterrents against forgery and extend 
them to financial instruments. Intended to serve as both a 
shaming device and a means of publicizing the offender’s 
betrayal, this penalty scheme armed judges with a flexible 
  
 27. ALFRED HIATT, THE MAKING OF MEDIEVAL FORGERIES: FALSE DOCUMENTS IN 
FIFTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 28 (2004). 
 28. Id. See generally Randall McGowen, From Pillory to Gallows: The 
Punishment of Forgery in the Age of Financial Revolution, 165 PAST & PRESENT 
107 (1999) [hereinafter McGowen, From Pillory to Gallows]. 
 29. Randall McGowen, Making the ‘Bloody Code’? Forgery Legislation in 
Eighteenth-Century England, in LAW, CRIME AND ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1660–1830, 
at 117, 121 (Norma Landau, ed., 2002). 
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means of combatting new forms of deceit enabled by 
changing modes of economic activity.30 
Such provisions nonetheless pale in comparison to the 
legislative attention drawn to the problem of forgery over 
the course of the long eighteenth century, a period that saw 
the addition of hundreds of new forgery provisions to the 
books, many inflicting the penalty of death.31 Long cast as 
the key exemplars of England’s “bloody code,” this explosion 
of legislation has come to be understood as part of the 
nation’s monetary policy, registering growing concern about 
abuses of trust among private parties. “The crime of forgery 
is so enormous in itself, and so destructive of the mercantile 
interest,” prosecutors repeatedly argued, “that it ought to be 
discouraged in a trading nation, beyond almost any other 
crime.”32 This way of thinking about—if not exactly on 
behalf of—the commercial class was codified in a sweeping 
1729 statute that rendered the forgery of “any deed, will, 
testament, bond, writing obligatory, bill of exchange, 
promissory note for payment of money, indorsement or 
assignment of any bill of exchange, or promissory note for 
the payment of goods” a capital offense, one that was rarely 
pardoned.33 
  
 30. See HIATT, supra note 27, at 26-27; McGowen, From Pillory to Gallows, 
supra note 28, at 121-23. On the “reinvention” of money in England at the end of 
the seventeenth century, see CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, 
CURRENCY, AND THE COMING OF CAPITALISM 11-12 (2014). 
 31. See generally Carl Wennerlind, The Death Penalty as Monetary Policy: 
The Practice of Punishment of Monetary Crime, 1690–1830, 36 HIST. POL. ECON. 
131 (2004). 
 32. McGowen, From Pillory to Gallows, supra note 28, at 136. 
 33. V. A. C. GATTRELL, THE HANGING TREE: EXECUTION AND THE ENGLISH 
PEOPLE, 1770–1868 (1996); McGowen, From Pillory to Gallows, supra note 27, at 
128, 136; Wennerlind, supra note 31, at 131; cf. PETER LINEBAUGH, THE LONDON 
HANGED: CRIME AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1992). It has 
been estimated that one out of every three forgers was executed in the last 
quarter of the eighteenth century, as compared with less than one half of those 
convicted of burglary and highway robbery. See CLIVE EMSLEY, CRIME AND 
SOCIETY IN ENGLAND, 1750–1900 (1996). On the cultural representations of 
forgers, see LINCOLN B. FALLER, TURNED TO ACCOUNT: THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS 
OF CRIMINAL BIOGRAPHY IN LATE SEVENTEENTH- AND EARLY EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 
ENGLAND 192 (1987). 
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Yet the severity of this new wave of statutes 
undermined their efficacy. As they were invoked, attention 
was redirected from the offense to the offender in popular 
discourse, exciting sympathy from the reading public. This 
was in no small part owing to the social identity of those 
who were tried and convicted of this crime, for they were 
typically drawn from the middling classes and seemed to 
have succumbed to the temptation of forgery in a moment of 
weakness brought on by financial failure and an anxious 
desire to provide for their family and preserve their 
respectable status.34 Although sentencing judges tended to 
treat the status of offenders as an aggravating factor, others 
saw them as products of their environment, symptomatic of 
“an overheated City culture that robbed people of their 
social moorings” and led them to “confuse the illusion with 
the real substance won by hard work and scrupulous 
conduct.” Journalists and pamphleteers put these ideas into 
circulation, accentuating the elements of misfortune that 
conspired against the condemned criminals and mourning 
the lost potential: “Mr. Smith had [t]alents, and a [g]enius, 
that might not only have secured him from the 
[t]emptations of [w]ant, but that, if properly applied, and 
accompanied with [i]ndustry, [h]onesty, and [a]pplication, 
might have rendered him a useful [m]ember of [s]ociety, and 
enabled him to live in [a]ffluence.”35 
The moral ambiguity of such portraits reflected and 
reinforced critiques of England’s capital laws. As early as 
1765, Blackstone was identifying the “multitude of 
sanguinary laws” lately passed by Parliament as indicative 
of a national “distemper,” deeming it to be “a kind of 
quackery in government . . . to apply the same universal 
remedy, the ultimum supplicium, to every case of 
difficulty.”36 Drawing strength from such professional 
  
 34. See, e.g., Randall McGowen, Forgery Discovered: Or the Perils of 
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misgivings, as well as those expressed in the popular press, 
reformers singled out the capital sanctions for forgery as 
especially misguided innovations of an incompetent 
legislature that were “anachronistic and out of line with the 
habits and sensibilities of the people,” rendering them 
especially difficult to enforce without arbitrariness and 
great expense.37 Appearing far more concerned about the 
brutalizing effects of the scaffold on the lower classes who 
witnessed the hangings of forgers than the offense itself, 
they advocated more “enlightened” principles of 
proportionality and sought to institute a new disciplinary 
regime that governed by sympathy and self-interest rather 
than example and terror, a regime built on the psychological 
premise that “compassion begets confidence.” Successfully 
mobilizing public opinion by means of a petition campaign 
that boasted the signatures of hundreds of bankers, 
merchants, and other “practical” men, they ultimately 
secured the repeal of most of the capital forgery statutes in 
1830, marking a significant juncture in the transition from 
“the gallows to the prison”38 in the history of punishment.39 
Across the Atlantic, Americans had grown accustomed 
to improvising where matters of currency and law 
enforcement were concerned. By the time of the Revolution 
many had developed a strong aversion to centralized 
governmental control of monetary policy and an even 
greater abhorrence of sanguinary punishments. Specie-
starved, American colonists placed their faith in paper 
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money out of necessity; provincial legislatures began issuing 
bills of credit from the end of the seventeenth century 
forward with the intent of stimulating trade, as well as the 
knowledge that they were enabling fraud, given the 
dizzying array of notes and coins that were in circulation by 
the 1740s. Efforts on the part of imperial authorities to put 
an end to the colonies’ emissions of paper currency in the 
second half of the century were arguably most effective in 
fomenting political rebellion. All the while, full-fledged 
counterfeiters proliferated, organizing into gangs and plying 
their trade with relative ease since it was fairly easy to 
break out of jail and flee to another colony to begin anew. 
The penalties attaching to the crime varied from a fine to 
death across jurisdictions that were either unable or 
disinclined to coordinate with one another.40 Offenders who 
were caught and tried faced ambivalent juries who tended 
to regard them with varying mixtures of anger and 
admiration, some regarding their property offenses as 
conferring a public benefit of sorts, insofar as it increased 
the money supply.41 Fighting a losing battle against such 
outlaws in 1773, New York Assemblyman Phillip Schuyler 
proposed that a new run of bills be issued with imagery 
designed to deter such activity: 
an eye in a cloud, a cart and coffins, three felons on a gallows, a 
weeping father and mother, with several small children, a burning 
pit, human figures being forced into it by fiends, a label with the 
words “Let the name of a Money Maker rot,” and such other 
additions as the commissioners might think proper.42 
The deterrent effect of these paper threats may well be 
doubted, given the proliferation of fake notes in this period, 
some even announcing their illicit status by way of obvious 
errors, with telling misspellings like “COUUTERFEIT.”43 
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The moneymakers who may have posed the greatest danger 
to the American colonies were those who were working for 
the British government during the Revolutionary War. 
Seizing the main chance as the Continental Congress and 
individual colonies emitted ever more currency to fund their 
war efforts, John Bull took to counterfeiting, thereby 
perpetrating a form of economic warfare which contributed 
significantly to the depreciation of the wartime paper 
money known as “continentals,” a word that became 
synonymous with worthlessness over the course of this 
imperial conflict.44 
This experience crucially shaped the way newly 
liberated Americans thought about paper currency and its 
counterfeits. Reflecting a hard-money bias, the framers of 
the Constitution prohibited states from emitting “bills of 
credit” and making “anything but Gold or Silver Coin a 
Tender in Payment of Debts,” which fostered the growth of 
state-chartered banks of varying degrees of reputability, 
some being stringently regulated by requirements as to 
species reserves, and others allowed to issue notes with 
abandon. They were joined by the Bank of the United 
States, authorized by Congress in 1791, though the charter 
was allowed to expire in 1811 amid lingering doubts about 
its constitutionality sown by opponents of federal attempts 
to control the money supply. At the same time, not only 
state but also state-chartered banks were instituted, 
catering to “most every special interest or class”—
tradesmen, farmers, artisans, among others—and the notes 
they issued were famously easy to counterfeit.45 This 
prompted a new coalition of bankers and legislators, with 
the support of President James Madison, to secure the 
chartering of the Second Bank of the United States in 1816, 
arguing that it would protect the people from forgers as well 
as irresponsible bank managers in the several states—in 
other words, from “legal and illegal counterfeiters of 
money.” Yet precisely because the notes of the Second Bank 
promised to provide a uniform national currency, which 
would circulate at par across the land, they became the 
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prime target of counterfeiters who were not easily 
combatted, particularly as President Andrew Jackson rose 
to power and took aim at the “monster,” joining forces with 
a new generation of renegade bankers who resented federal 
control, together bringing about its demise by 1834.46 
Jackson’s removal of federal deposits and subsequent 
actions to eradicate the “paper system” of banking—
animated by what his opponents called the “Gold 
Humbug”—resulted in financial chaos, as state banks grew 
exponentially, so that there were nearly six hundred such 
entities in operation by 1837, a crisis point in the nation’s 
economy, inaugurating a period of panic and depression of 
unprecedented proportions that inspired the creation of a 
new form of currency—“shinplasters”—that were printed in 
fractions of dollars by individuals and businesses desperate 
to find a way forward amidst the rubble of failed banks and 
their now valueless notes. Although these were 
emphatically not authorized by any state, the liberty to 
make money was soon given a sort of legal cover with the 
enactment of “free banking laws” in a number of states, 
including New York, which allowed anyone who could raise 
a specified amount of capital to incorporate as a note-
issuing bank. Thus the “Bank Wars” of Jacksonian America 
stand as illustrations of “the strange yet revealing 
intermingling of counterfeiting, capitalism, and democratic 
politics” on Mihm’s account, signaling “a growing tolerance 
for illicit money-making of all kinds” and ushering in a 
period in which “a new generation of criminal capitalists 
could operate with impunity.”47 
In no place was this truer than antebellum New York 
City. Or so Mihm suggests in his remarkable reconstruction 
of the criminal underworld of forgers and passers of bogus 
currency who almost always managed to stay a step ahead 
of policemen in this burgeoning urban center.48 “Confronted 
with crumbling categories,” Mihm observes, “many 
shopkeepers, merchants, retailers, and other money 
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handlers abandoned the quest for certainty, substituting in 
its place a corrupt pragmatism” and adopting the “informal 
credo” that a “well-crafted imitation on a reputable bank” 
was better than “a genuine issue of a bad bank.” Yet his 
rendering of the “counterfeit economy” that flourished in 
this era is largely based upon the surviving court records of 
criminal trials, which raises questions about whether this 
period did indeed witness the “obliteration” of “the divide 
between the counterfeit and the real.” Although some 
attention is drawn to the governing statutes, their 
application in the common run of cases is not systematically 
explored. The reader is instead left with the impression that 
the law’s enforcers were simply overmatched by a wily 
counterfeiting class, whose members made accomplices of 
almost everyone else by the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century. While drawing attention to privately 
produced “counterfeit detectors,” which were published by 
self-appointed (and self-interested) “arbiter[s] of 
authenticity” and designed to protect merchants against 
imposition, Mihm does not explore the decisional law 
produced by those with the legal authority to apprehend 
and punish perpetrators of fraud.49 To be sure, police forces, 
jails, and other institutional mechanisms for redressing 
financial crimes were skeletal when measured by today’s 
standards, or even those that prevailed in the aftermath of 
the Civil War. But in focusing on those who evaded or 
openly defied the law, Mihm does not fully capture the 
complex public and private modes of regulating 
moneymaking in the period before the federal issuance of 
Greenbacks and creation of the Secret Service which 
fundamentally changed the stakes of counterfeiting.50 
Returning to the antebellum courtroom where 
Huntington was called to account for his forgery, for his 
utterance of “a black lie and a white lie at the same time,” 
enables us to see that the permissiveness of the law has 
been significantly overstated.51 To be sure, revolutionary 
American statesmen endeavored to reduce the sanctions 
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attaching to this crime, a move intended to express “the 
special character of justice in the fledgling American 
republics.”52 Indeed, the earliest state constitutions 
articulated “enlightened” ideals of proportionality 
understood to entail revision of the sanguinary laws of their 
English ancestors. “No wise legislature will affix the same 
punishment to crimes of theft, forgery, and the like, which 
they do to those of murder and treason,” pronounced the 
New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, averring that “where 
the same undistinguishing severity is exerted against all 
offenses the people are led to forget the real distinction in 
the crimes themselves, and to commit the most flagrant 
with as little compunction as they do those of the lightest 
dye.”53 Yet such sentiments were not immediately 
operationalized in criminal codes and the removal of the 
capital sanction hardly signaled the dawning of an era of 
toleration for forgers. To the contrary, the reformers were 
primarily concerned with putting an end to the public 
exhibitions of “counterfeit contrition” staged whenever such 
wrongdoers were about to be hanged and working instead to 
inspire more genuine forms of repentance within the 
confines of penitentiaries.54 Federal and state criminal codes 
contained extensive provisions delineating various classes of 
crime—including counterfeiting, debasing the coinage, 
passing bad coins, forging public securities, bank notes, and 
others sorts of financial instruments—and they also 
prescribed norms of economic behavior, more than a few 
retaining prohibitions of usury, though this was mainly 
enforced by means of civil sanctions. Criminal penalties 
prescribed for forgery and counterfeiting (words often 
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treated as synonymous) ranged from death (under federal 
law) to prison terms (the typical range being from three to 
twenty years) to fines. Judges and jurists gave meaning to 
these statutory provisions in elaborately written opinions 
and treatises that underscored the infinitude of fraud, 
complicating any effort to reconstruct historically what 
constituted the law of case.55 
In refusing to state any hard and fast rule, the 
expositors of the law of fraud effectively took their 
operations under cover. As problematic as they 
acknowledged this to be in a political culture that placed 
such a high premium on the clarity and comprehensiveness 
of their criminal codes, antebellum American lawmakers 
acknowledged that they would have to be as cunning as 
moneymakers if they were to succeed in capturing them.56 
This is not, however, to suggest that the law on the 
books did not matter. To the contrary, it provides an 
essential starting point for making sense of Huntington’s 
ultimate fate. The indictment was based upon Section 33 of 
New York’s Criminal Code, which had been revised several 
years before his trial to read:  
Every person who, with intent to injure or defraud, shall falsely 
make, alter, forge or counterfeit, (1) [a]ny instrument or writing, 
being, or purporting to be . . . (2) . . . the act of another, by which 
any pecuniary demand or obligation shall be, or shall purport to 
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be, created, increased, discharged . . . [b]y which false making, 
forging, altering or counterfeiting, any person may be affected, 
bound, or in any way injured in his person and property . . . shall 
be adjudged guilty of forgery in the third degree.57 
This offense carried with it a maximum sentence of five 
years in prison. In the revisers’ notes they remarked that 
“the offense of passing counterfeit bills is perhaps the most 
frequent of any presented to our criminal courts” and 
further observed that it typically involved 
two very distinct classes of offenders; one, consisting of the actual 
bold forger or his associate; the other, consisting of the duped and 
ignorant citizen, who, although suspicious of a bill that he has 
received, yet gets rid of it, on the first opportunity. The latter, 
though highly criminal, is not of the same deep depravity of the 
former. 
This perceived difference in the degree of culpability was 
most clearly registered in “the reluctance of juries to convict 
in the latter case, and thus expose such persons to the very 
severe penalties of the law.” Accordingly, the revisers had 
carefully crafted a lesser offense for possessing or uttering 
any forged or counterfeit instrument that had been 
innocently acquired, for which the maximum prison 
sentence was two years, this being deemed to be better 
“proportioned to the actual guilt.”58 
Yet none of the other note brokers with whom 
Huntington dealt were prosecuted under this section, nor 
was the foolishness of his victims in taking his notes of any 
legal significance in the estimation of the district attorney; 
the duped men were likened to “the theologian [who] 
sometimes hugs the false to his bosom, and rejects the true 
because ignorant of it.” They were not to be blamed for 
trusting the defendant, for confidence was “the very life and 
essence of commerce” and they had no choice but to believe 
what they were told; in doing so, they were “merely obeying 
every dictate of charity—not to judge others lest we should 
be judged ourselves.” Placing Huntington’s crimes on par 
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with the most violent of offenses—“[t]his man has stabbed 
at the commercial reputation of men you and I have an 
interest in. He has inflicted a blow on the people of New 
York”—the threat to the moral integrity of “this great 
commercial metropolis” was localized in him. Glossing over 
evidence that his notes were clumsy fakes, Hall endeavored 
to persuade the jurors that the prisoner was as devious as 
he was depraved, operating in accordance with “the most 
wide awake and shrewd method” and animated by “a sort of 
moral insanity that seemed to have seized him.”59 
This would prove to be an unfortunate choice of words. 
For the defense team, headed by the virtuoso trial attorney 
James T. Brady, agreed that their client was morally 
insane, documenting a life history of destructive behavior 
and business failure that supported this medical hypothesis, 
which was made the basis of their argument for acquittal. 
They did so over Huntington’s manifest objection, uttered in 
open court: “A splendid farce this! A capital joke by gad!” 
Most news editors immediately echoed his sentiments, 
generously heaping ridicule on this suspect means of 
dodging criminal responsibility. To claim that the tendency 
to develop and advance “ridiculous schemes to get rich 
without labor” was “a token of insanity” was to argue for the 
legal irresponsibility of men like P. T. Barnum (whose 
operations were wilder than anything Huntington had ever 
dreamed up) and embolden knaves everywhere to “make 
such a dash at crime as to astonish the world and attract its 
admiration, so that, if money not buy a release, the very 
boldness of the crime will acquit the ground of insanity.”60 
II. COUNTERFEITING INSANITY 
When Huntington’s lawyers dropped the bombshell of 
the insanity defense in courtroom, District Attorney Hall 
must have felt like the joke was on him. While he likely 
lived to regret this rhetorical move, Hall had chosen words 
that were quite commonly used to describe the Mammon-
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worshipping commercial classes, underscoring just how 
crazed they could be made by their own cupidity. The 
diagnosis of moral insanity was first introduced into the 
cultural lexicon by late eighteenth century “mad doctors” 
who sought to widen the legal category of insanity so as to 
comprehend non-intellectual forms of mental illness. 
Seasoned criminal defense attorneys like Brady were alive 
to the ways that this “medical jurisprudence” of insanity 
could be deployed upon behalf of their clients.61 Yet in 
deploying the plea of moral insanity, Brady and his co-
counsel, John A. Bryan were engaged in something of a 
pioneering move, as this doctrine was not much used 
outside of the context of homicide cases, where it was rarely 
successful. This strategy was all the more dicey because it 
tended to provoke skeptical reactions, not only on the part 
of prosecutors, judges, jurors, and the general public, but 
also increasingly within the field of mental medicine, 
invariably inviting all manner of slippery slope arguments. 
The commentary offered in connection with the Huntington 
case by the editor of The American Journal of Insanity may 
be taken as a representative example:  
It is not always easy to account for the schemes and conduct of a 
villain, because villainy is not the normal state of men, although it 
may seem to be fast getting to be so. If it is to be palliated by 
scientific excuses of moral insanity, or other dubious apologies for 
misconduct and crime, the period is not far off when each 
particular offense against social law and order will have its 
particular form of insanity, real or simulated, presented as a plea 
to ward off punishment, and when the whole vocabulary of the 
dead languages will be in requisition to provide a nomenclature 
adapted to the multifarious iniquities to which men are prone.62  
By the defense attorneys’ own admission, the insanity 
plea was something of a last-ditch effort, entertained only 
after the prosecution had rested and Huntington could not 
be persuaded by Brady to throw himself on the mercy of the 
court, instead maintaining with an oddly calm assurance 
that “he had done nothing for which he ought to be 
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punished, and . . . he was sure he would be acquitted.” In 
their puzzlement and frustration, his counselors suddenly 
recalled a remark the injured party, William Harbeck, had 
made to the investigating magistrate, intimating “he 
thought Huntington was crazy,” which prompted them to 
seek out the expert opinions of “two of the most eminent in 
the medical profession.” The doctors’ personal inspection 
and diagnosis of the mental condition of the accused 
convinced the defense that Huntington’s “reckless and 
incautious habit of forgery” was indeed the product of an 
“insane impulse,” Bryan analogizing the plea they were 
offering to that made by the Prince of Denmark:  
Was’t Hamlet wrong’d Laertes? Never Hamlet:  
If Hamlet from himself be ta’en away,  
And when he’s not himself does wrong Laertes,  
Then Hamlet does it not: Hamlet denies it.  
Who does it then? His madness. If’t be so,  
Hamlet is of the faction that is wrong’d;  
His madness is poor Hamlet’s enemy.63  
In taking this particular leaf from Shakespeare, Bryan was 
guilty of a gaff at least as serious as Hall’s, for he 
unwittingly played into the hands of his opponents, who 
were already primed to charge the defense with feigning 
insanity. They gleefully alluded to warring readings of 
Hamlet’s state of mind in the realm of literary criticism, 
suggesting that many critics adjudged him “a simulated 
lunatic.” Unsurprisingly, the prosecutors favored this 
interpretation as applied to a fictional prince as well as the 
defendant, hastening to add that the “antic disposition” was 
put on in the case at bar for the purpose of covering rather 
than detecting a crime—“the greatest known in a 
commercial community.” Sounding more than a little like 
the newsmen competing to sell papers, Hall puffed his side 
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of the story, promising to rival not only his opponents’ 
account, but the works of the great playwright as well: “You 
may pile your book-cases with novels and dramas, but you 
will never find them as interesting as the transactions that 
pass before you in this courtroom. It is a little story, but a 
comprehensive one.”64 
In view of all this showmanship, these lawyers might be 
fairly assimilated to the class of American confidence men, 
as they traded on the ambiguity of rules and were prone to 
hyperbole and exaggeration, especially when they professed 
to be speaking in earnest. Yet upon closer inspection, even 
the most theatrical of trials may disclose a great deal about 
the laws that conditioned and gave meaning to the money-
making activities men pursued on the light and dark sides 
of Wall Street. Though there were surely gray areas and 
many cases of clear wrongdoing that never made it to court, 
their significance cannot be fully appreciated unless they 
are considered in relation to the statute books and treatises 
which set out the elements of crimes of confidence in a 
hierarchical order, conveying a carefully delineated and 
amazingly detailed moral scheme so far as culpability was 
concerned. Such sources crucially shaped the kinds of 
narratives the counselors told, offering jurors two distinct 
ways of accounting for Huntington’s forgeries as a matter of 
their state’s criminal law. And they were even more 
consequential in shaping the judgment ultimately rendered, 
one that landed the defendant in Sing-Sing and left his 
finances shrouded in mystery.  
Working within the constraints of the applicable 
statute, opposing counselors offered dramatically divergent 
storylines, rooted in diametrically opposed assessments of 
Huntington’s capacity to do evil. Whereas the prosecution’s 
argument was presented in the form of a depravity 
narrative that straightforwardly took the defendant’s 
actions to have been motived by greed, the defense told a 
tale of mental illness, authenticated by putative experts 
whose testimony was supplemented by works of medical 
jurisprudence, from which the counselors quoted at length. 
Accordingly, we find Hall dwelling on the deliberate 
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fashioning of the forgeries on the part of Huntington as 
evidence of his criminal intent as well as the danger he 
presented to all legitimate business dealings while Brady 
instead focused attention on the crudity of his notes, with 
the implication that the brokers who claimed to be his 
victims were either manipulating him or behaving in such a 
careless way as to be justly punished by the financial losses 
they had suffered. At bottom, it was a question of which was 
more laughable: Huntington’s forgeries or the defense of 
moral insanity. 
The hundreds of pages of testimony found between the 
elaborate opening and closing arguments of the attorneys 
provided the material for assembling dueling biographies of 
the defendant, leaving jurors to decide whether or not the 
next chapter of his life—and perhaps the last, given what 
his attorneys described as his “delicate constitution, and 
highly nervous and sensitive temperament”—would be set 
in state prison. The defense played up the haplessness of 
their client and rooted his apparent disregard for the laws 
of God and man in a hereditary defect, contending that he 
descended from a long line of mental defectives, rendering 
him incapable of being the “mercenary forger” the 
prosecution made him out to be. They contended that 
Harbeck and his associates were the prime movers behind 
the scenes, these men being motivated “not so much from a 
feeling of revenge, as it is from a desire to shield themselves 
from suspicion of complicity in these forgeries, while they at 
the same time put this defendant out of the way.”65 
Displaying an impressive command of the medico-legal 
literature on moral insanity, Brady contended that 
Huntington presented a textbook case, clearly being unable 
to form the intent to injure required to convict him of the 
crime of forgery. “You will find,” he maintained, “that the 
animus furandi, as the lawyers express it, was no more an 
element of these offenses than we find in the lad, who covets 
and partakes, over a garden wall, some tempting fruit 
which does not belong to him.” Jurors could thus rest 
assured that allowing this man “to go forth to the 
community again” presented no threat to public safety. 
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Indeed Bryan slyly insinuated that the defendant’s example 
might operate as a form of law enforcement:  
Gentlemen, remember that should he be acquitted he will go forth 
advertised. If he had a placard placed upon his breast and another 
upon his back displaying in broad letters the words, “Insane 
Forger,” he could not be more thoroughly advertised than he will 
be by this trial. There will be no possibility of his doing any 
further mischief of this kind for his hand is palsied by the 
notoriety of his case. But if the community of money-lenders will 
not be on their guard now, we must believe that the Almighty has 
purposely made them in his wrath, as insane and deluded as 
Charles B. Huntington; and that Charles B. Huntington will again 
become, what we think he has been already, a humble instrument 
in the hands of Providence, to take from them their ill-gotten 
gains.66 
While they maintained that the defendant’s insanity 
plea refuted itself, Hall and his co-counsel, William Curtis 
Noyes, nonetheless labored to distinguish the defendant’s 
felonious way to wealth from the mindless pursuits of 
madmen as well as the legitimate moneymaking ventures of 
(most) Wall Street traders. Maintaining that Huntington’s 
life story was that of “a criminal,” and not “an unfortunate,” 
Noyes mercilessly attacked the pretenses of the supposed 
medical experts, who could not possibly have determined 
the state of the defendant’s mind upon the basis of a few 
short visits, likely orchestrated after the accused had been 
coached to play the part of a fool. In building their case 
upon such shaky testimony, he advised the jurors, the 
defense was “making a draft upon your credulity” which 
Noyes could not believe they would answer with anything 
other than a guilty verdict. And so he simply but forcefully 
urged them to prevent villainy from becoming normal by 
convicting Huntington. “Whilst we cannot change the 
current of human nature, while legislators in vain may 
endeavor to coerce human nature,” Noyes submitted: 
[W]e may at last restrain and correct vice by maintaining the 
character of this great metropolis, and keeping it in that proper 
check which is the aim of all law. . . . And although strangers may 
sneer at this city, which we may proudly call a metropolis, and 
designate it the modern Sodom and Gomorrah, if it is ever to be 
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saved I believe it will be redeemed because there may be found in 
it twelve righteous men, and they will be those who sit from day to 
day in the jury box of the criminal courts.67 
At the conclusion of these proceedings, the presiding 
judge, Elisha Capron, issued a fairly mechanical charge. 
While he studiously avoided any commentary on the facts of 
the matter, his remarks did betray a decided distaste for the 
ways of Wall Street, albeit balanced out by a commitment to 
the rule of law and pronounced doubts about moral insanity 
as an excusing condition. Providing instructions that 
conformed to the strictures of the McNaughten test of 
criminal responsibility, Capron impressed upon jurors that 
it was theirs to decide whether this disease had obliterated 
the defendant’s capacity to know the difference between 
right and wrong. If it had, Huntington was to be “promptly 
restored to his family and to society,” but if it had not, “the 
interests of the whole commercial world require that he be 
certainly and speedily punished.” Less than four hours 
later, they returned with a guilty verdict, which prompted 
the defendant to visibly sink into his chair, though 
according to reports “his self-possession immediately 
returned, and did not again desert him.” Days away from a 
planned retirement from office, Capron immediately moved 
into the sentencing phase of the trial. By the court’s order, 
Huntington was to be confined for the maximum term 
authorized under the statute, four years and ten months, in 
the famously impregnable Sing Sing Prison.68 
III. “CRIME CONTAGIOUS” 
“Thus has terminated one of the most remarkable trials 
of the day,” reported the Springfield Republican as 
reprinted in St. Alban’s Messenger on January 15, 1857, 
“and contrary to general expectation, a New York court has 
decreed the punishment of a magnificent swindler.” While 
the verdict concerned only one of “hundreds of forgeries 
committed by the defendant,” this report of a report 
conveyed the expectation that “the other [indictments] will 
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not be pressed, the ends of justice being fully served, it is 
believed, by the result of this case.” Other newspaper 
reports were downright exultant in their renderings of the 
outcome of this trial. “A great and good thing in behalf of 
justice, public morality, individual honesty and the safety of 
society has been achieved in the conviction and sentence of 
Huntington, the forger and swindler, to the utmost penalty 
of the law,” gloried the self-consciously self-righteous New 
York Herald, in an editorial worth quoting at length:  
Considering the success of New York financiers, defaulters, 
political rowdies, bullies, burglars and assassins, in escaping the 
penalty of the penalties of their crimes, through “the law’s delay,” 
and the tricks of artful shysters and corrupt officials, we had 
reason to fear the acquittal of Huntington upon some microscopic 
flaw, some technical informality or a divided jury. The result, 
therefore, exceeds our highest expectations in behalf of justice, 
law and order. We are disposed to regard it as the inauguration of 
a new epoch in the prosecution of rogues, ruffians and swindling 
financiers before our courts. The conviction and the full sentence 
of Huntington are particularly gratifying in view of the 
outrageous defence set up for the criminal by his counsel. “Moral 
insanity.” The impudence of this plea stands out in conspicuous 
relief, “grand, gloomy and peculiar.” — “Moral insanity!” We have 
no doubt that the shocking insolence of this miserable discovery 
contributed much to give emphasis to the verdict of the jury and 
the sentence of the Judge. 
The editor adjudged the defense was “worse than 
useless” to the defendant, opining that he would have been 
far better served had his counselors pursued “a legal line of 
defence . . . to wit: the mitigation plea—that the forgeries 
complained of were not in reality perfected, and were not 
forgeries in the ordinary sense of the word, but financial 
experiments of a ‘confidence man,’ of a bold and dashing, 
and singularly romantic and successful character.” Without 
pausing to reflect upon the ethical standards the Herald 
was effectively advancing—not least by publicizing this 
advice—the paper took its leave of the matter of Huntington 
the Forger with its expression of “the hope that his case 
gives quietus to this insolent dodge of ‘moral insanity.’”69  
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This hope was not to be realized, in no small part 
because papers like the Herald continued to milk such trials 
for all they were worth, arguably rendering them 
responsible for turning these legal events into the sorts of 
spectacles that the editors purported to deplore. The penny 
presses were even more obsessed with the subject of crime, 
devoting considerable space to all manner of deviant 
behavior, from petty thieving to murders most foul. Their 
practices excited the concern of more “respectable” news 
outlets, who ran stories about “those newspapers which 
labor most earnestly to give the earliest and the fullest 
details of crime,” repeating a long-standing worry about the 
potential of news stories of vice to breed more of the same. 
Appearing under the headline “CRIME CONTAGIOUS,” 
one 1858 editorial published by the Boston Recorder tallied 
the social costs of such journalistic conventions:  
Multitudes have been led into crime by reading the details of our 
police gazettes, and other sickening receptacles of abomination, 
who, but for this mental contamination, would have lived and died 
honored, respected, and beloved. . . . Woe to the man that inhales 
it; woe to the individual who becomes contaminated with its 
poisonous exhalations; woe to him who studies the literature of 
our criminal courts, and makes police reports a portion of his daily 
mental food. . . . Who ever saw a minute report of a cunning fraud, 
an accomplished act of villainy, forgery, theft, embezzlement, that 
was not immediately followed by a multitude of similar cases, 
excited by reading the description in our public journals?70  
Sounding not a little like the agonized writings of 
earlier criminal law reformers, as they observed the effects 
of public hangings, this editorial concluded that crime 
stories threatened to turn offenders like “Huntington, the 
forger” into “heroes of the hour.” Yet thankfully a 
prescription was near at hand, on this analysis, the paper 
enlisting “public opinion” as well as other newsmen in the 
task of improving the mental environment, envisioning a 
kind of virtuous cycle. “This avidity for the recital of the 
monstrous and the horrible in crime,” it was suggested, 
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should be checked by a wholesome restriction by the public 
opinion upon the press, and not fostered, nourished, maddened by 
such printed histories of horrors. . . . Present as seldom as possible 
to the public gaze the sickening accounts of the morbidly insane, 
the abandoned and the corrupt, and the mania of crime will be 
diminished according.71  
Perhaps needless to say, this was wishful thinking, and 
while the complex role of newspapers in the cultural process 
of capturing fraud is a story for another day, it is perhaps 
worth noting, by way of conclusion, what finally became of 
Huntington. In the months after he was committed to Sing 
Sing, there were periodic reports about how he lived in 
prison—stories which indicated he had become a model 
prisoner, initially taking up the honest craft of furniture 
building, which had been his father’s main occupation, and 
subsequently becoming “one of the chief-book-keepers of the 
establishment.” However, the contagion of his crime proved 
not so easily quarantined. In April of 1857, a story broke 
about a stranger called John Scatchard, who had been 
arrested on a very peculiar charge of attempted forgery: he 
had approached several friends of Huntington, claiming to 
be working with an unnamed person in New Orleans, to 
secure the release of the prisoner and ensure his safe 
passage to Cuba. While claiming at first to be proceeding 
lawfully, it eventually became clear that this was to be 
accomplished by means of a faked pardon and bogus bench 
warrant as well as “a counterfeit telegraph pole,” which he 
explained would keep the warden from communicating with 
the Governor’s office and finding out the papers were 
frauds. His real aim was to extract money from 
Huntington’s friends and skip town before he was 
discovered. Newsmen had a field day with the whole affair, 
since it also implicated Bryan and Brady, who seemed to 
have initially displayed some interest in participating in the 
plot. The ensuing trial was described by one reporter as 
“really interesting and amusing, and might suggest the idea 
of moral insanity, although it would be somewhat difficult 
where to locate the disease.” Although the defendant was 
ultimately found guilty as charged by a jury, they “strongly 
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recommended him to mercy” and the presiding judge 
accordingly suspended judgment, prompting Scatchard to 
“exit from the [c]ourt majestically.” What became of him 
thereafter is difficult to piece together, though there are 
hints that his real name was James B. Cross and that this 
was neither his first nor his last forgery. He surfaced again 
in the popular press in 1867 upon being arrested in New 
York and taken to Chicago to stand trial on another forgery 
charge, by which time he had earned the reputation of “a 
prodigy in his way.” What he had done this time is not clear 
from the surviving newspaper accounts, though the last 
published story on the matter promised more: “It is said 
that one-half of this queer transaction is not yet known, and 
that some singular developments will be made on the 
examination, which will take place at an early day.” The 
reading public may have been left in suspense about what 
became of Scatchard/Cross, but it is more than possible that 
they read about him again without even knowing it, given 
the elusive nature of the subject. Like the title character in 
The Confidence Man, this imposter may have gone on to con 
again, proving the truth of the last words of Melville’s 
disquietingly amusing novel: “Something further may follow 
of this Masquerade.”72 
Huntington the forger was not so fortunate, so far as we 
know. Upon release from Sing Sing in 1862, several of his 
creditors obtained a judgment against him and an order of 
arrest was granted, which landed him in the Westchester 
County Jail. Although he petitioned for discharge under 
New York’s insolvency law, the court sustained the 
objection of his creditors, who insisted that Huntington’s 
status as an unpardoned felon rendered him incompetent to 
make the necessary affidavit. “Out of the frying pan and 
into the fire,” read the last news report of his whereabouts. 
Of course, something further might have followed in his 
case as well. But from the standpoint of legal history, what 
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matters most is that he did not simply get away with his 
crimes. While lawyers and showman both had their reasons 
for playing with the boundaries of fraud, accounts of the 
blurriness of this line have been greatly exaggerated. 
Attending more closely to the cases of those brought to 
justice will shed important light on the defining features of 
white and black lies in Barnum’s America. 
 
